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STONE’S EVIDENTIAL ATHEISM: A CRITIQUE
Timothy Pawl

In a pair of recent articles, Jim Stone presents a new version of the Evidential Argument from Evil. I provide two arguments against Stone’s Evidential
Problem of Evil, one from the dialectical standpoint of a theist, the second
from a dialectical standpoint that is neutral between theism and atheism. In
neither case, I argue, should an interlocutor accept all the premises of the
argument.

Introduction
Of all the arguments against the existence of God, the arguments gathered
together under the heading “The Problem of Evil” are surely the most
pressing for the theist. And within that unholy alliance, the arguments
with the most bite are the evidential arguments from evil. I present Jim
Stone’s new and interesting version of the Evidential Argument.1 I provide
two arguments against Stone’s Evidential Problem of Evil, one from the
dialectical standpoint of a theist, the second from a dialectical standpoint
that is neutral between theism and atheism. My goal is to show that neither
a theist nor a neutral observer should judge the argument to be sound.
From the theistic standpoint, I argue that a member of just about any
religious tradition has good reason to reject one or more of the premises.
My example of a religious tradition is Christianity, but others would work
just as well. In particular, Stone’s new Evidential Problem of Evil either
presupposes something no member of a religious tradition would grant or
else falls prey to an objection Stone himself raises from Alvin Plantinga’s
Free Will Defense.
I provide an additional argument from a neutral standpoint. I parody
the form of Stone’s argument to show that there is good reason to believe
that one of his premises is false.
Stone’s New Evidential Argument Against Evil
In two recent articles, Jim Stone provides a novel evidential argument
against theism. In this section I provide his considered formulation of the
argument, along with any background information necessary for tracking
1
Jim Stone, “Evidential Atheism,” Philosophical Studies 114 (2003), 253–277. This presentation will include the modifications Stone makes to the argument in his, “CORNEA,
Scepticism and Evil,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89:1 (2011), 59–70.
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it. Stone asks us to consider this claim, which he calls MT: “[e]very significant suffering that makes up the widespread and terrible suffering we
see about us results in an outweighing positive or negative utility.”2 What
we see of suffering, claims Stone, makes it improbable that there is an
outweighing utility for every instance of suffering; that is, what we see of
suffering makes MT improbable. Furthermore, probably, if God exists and
the world is not zany (this notion will be spelled out more fully later in
this section), there would be an outweighing utility for every instance of
suffering. Most likely, then, it is false that both God exists and the world
is not zany. However, probably, the world is not zany. If one conjunct of a
conjunction is probable, and the conjunction as a whole is unlikely, then
the remaining conjunct must have a very low probability. Therefore, it is
very likely that God does not exist.
Stone’s current version of this argument goes as follows:3
1. What we see of suffering makes MT improbable (premise).
2. We are justified in believing that the conjunction, C, of theism and
“we are not in a zany world” entails MT (premise).
3. For any propositions p and q, if what we see makes q improbable, and
we know p entails q, then p is unlikely given what we see (premise).
4. If what we see of suffering makes MT improbable, and we have the
justified belief that C entails MT, then C is unlikely, given what we
see (substitution from 3).
5. C is unlikely, given what we see (1, 2, 4).
6. If one of the two conjuncts in a conjunction with a likelihood of 0.19
or less is probable, then the other conjunct has a probability of no
more than 0.2111 (premise).4
7. Probably we are not in a zany world (premise).
8. Theism is a long shot (0.2111) given what we see of suffering (5, 6, 7).5
2
See Stone, “Evidential Atheism,” 258. Elsewhere, Stone restricts MT to natural evils,
saying “Let me stipulate that MT concerns only natural evil.” See ibid., 266.
3
Stone, “Evidential Atheism,” 267–268.
4
Here, briefly, is how Stone arrives at this figure. Stone stipulates that for a belief to be
justified (as he is using the term), it has to have a probability of at least .9. Since premise 1
and premise 2 are both justified, each has a probability of at least .9. The probability of a
conjunction with independent conjuncts is the product of the probability of its conjuncts. The
conjunction of premise 1 and premise 2, then, has a probability of at least .81. That conjunction entails ~C, and probability is preserved under entailment. So ~C has a probability of at
least .81. Thus C has a probability of at most .19. If one of the conjuncts of C were to have
a probability of .9, and C has a probability of at most .19, then we can determine the upper
limit of the probability of the other conjunct by determining what number, multiplied by .9,
yields .19. That number is .2111.
5
Stone gives this argument, aside from the change to the consequent of 3 (and hence slight
changes in 4 and 5), in “Evidential Atheism,” 267–268. I discuss those changes in discussing
the relevant premises below.
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Stone writes: “I submit that [this argument] provides a strong prima facie
case for theism’s implausibility.”6
A few notes on the argument are in order. Stone uses the term “probable” in a technical sense. He writes:
My concern is the epistemic likelihood that a thesis has for a believer given
her grounds for believing it. Let us say that p is “probable” for S when S has
grounds for believing p such that a fully rational person given them would,
on that basis, affirm p—not merely judge that p is a better bet than not-p . . .
So p is “probable” for S only if S’s grounds justify or warrant S’s believing p.7

Justification, claims Stone, requires a high degree of probability. Stone sets
a probability required for justified belief at .9, though he notes that even if
the probability for a belief to be justified were set at .8 his argument would
still succeed.8
Each of the first two premises, since we are justified in believing it, has
a probability of .9 or higher (given the high probability that Stone says
justification requires). And so, given the rule of reasoning expressed in
premise 3, it follows that theism is unlikely. Stone reasons as follows:
“not-MT” and “not-MT entails [not-C]” each have a probability of .9, their
conjunction has a probability of .81; as that conjunction entails [not-C], and
likelihood is preserved under entailment according to the probability calculus, [C] has a likelihood of no more than 0.19—a long shot.9

In what follows I will consider each of the premises, giving detail where
needed and explaining Stone’s modifications where relevant.
MT mentions instances of outweighing utility. An instance of suffering
results in an outweighing positive utility when an intrinsic good occurs, the
utility of that intrinsic good outweighs the disutility of the suffering, and
that intrinsic good would not have occurred had that suffering not occurred.10 Likewise, an instance of suffering results in an outweighing negative
utility when an intrinsic evil is avoided, the utility of the avoidance of that
6
See Stone, “CORNEA, Scepticism and Evil,” 12. Stone includes an antecedent to his
claim, but it is irrelevant to my point here. His full claim is: “Supposing we’re in the universe
we wish to explain, I submit that EPE . . . provides a strong prima facie case for theism’s
implausibility.” So, Stone claims here that the argument above provides a strong prima facie
case for theism’s implausibility, supposing we are in a universe we wish to explain. I doubt
Stone or I will see much opposition to the affirmation of this supposition. So this argument
is purported to provide a strong prima facie case against theism.
7
Stone, “Evidential Atheism,” 254.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid., 261–262.
10
For instance, Bob suffers a severe sickness. During this sickness Bob’s father nurses Bob
back to health. The close physical proximity and dependence of Bob on his father leads them
to a deeper love for one another. Years later, Bob smiles and says to his father, “Dad, thank
God for that sickness many moons ago, because had it not happened, we wouldn’t be as close
as we are today.” That love is an intrinsic good. The utility of the persisting love outweighs
the disutility of the fleeting sickness. And, had Bob not fallen ill, he and his father would
not have grown in their love. And so, Stone would claim here that the sickness results in an
outweighing positive utility.
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intrinsic evil outweighs the disutility of the suffering, and that intrinsic
evil would not have been avoided had that suffering not occurred.11
Stone notes that many theists will deny this first premise due to the
Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access, which Stephen Wykstra abbreviates “CORNEA”:
On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim “it appears
that p” only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely
be different than it is in some way discernible by her.12

The friend of CORNEA will deny premise 1 because our cognized situation, what we see of suffering around us, would not likely be discernibly
different were every suffering to have some outweighing positive or negative utility. For, were every instance of suffering to have some outweighing
utility, it would almost certainly be due to some powerful, knowledgeable,
good designer (call it God), and not merely due to chance. But God, with
his vast intelligence, could foresee and plan outweighing utilities far beyond our ken. We should expect such outweighing utilities beyond our
ken, were there a God. And so, were there outweighing utilities for all
evils, we would expect some (perhaps many) of these outweighing utilities
to be entirely beyond our current cognitive reach, making them appear
to have no outweighing utility. So it isn’t true that if MT were false our
cognized situation concerning suffering and its outweighing goods would
be discernibly different than it would be in a world where there is outweighing utility for every suffering—either way, there would be suffering
that appears pointless. Given CORNEA, we have reason to doubt the truth
of premise 1.13
11
Return to the Bob example. Suppose Bob is plotting the murder of his father so that he
can reap the benefits of a plump life insurance policy. But just before Bob puts the malicious
plan into action, he suffers a severe illness and his father nurses him back to health. The close
physical proximity and dependence of Bob on his father leads Bob to put off his patricidal
plans. Years later, Bob smiles and says to himself, “Dad should thank God for that sickness
many moons ago, because had it not happened, he wouldn’t be alive today.” That prevention
of pecuniary patricide is an avoidance of an intrinsic evil. The utility of preventing patricide
outweighs the disutility of the fleeting sickness. And, had Bob not fallen ill, he would have
killed his father for financial benefits. So Stone would claim here that the sickness results in
an outweighing negative utility. Premise one claims that what we see of suffering makes it
improbable that every instance of suffering results, as these Bob tales do, in some positive or
negative utility. These Bob examples are my own, not Stone’s.
12
Stephen Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On
Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance,’” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984),
73–93. Reprinted in The Problem of Evil, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Adams
(Oxford University Press, 1990), 152.
13
Stone’s first response to CORNEA was to argue that it is false. See “Evidential Atheism,”
263–265. However, Stone later comes to view CORNEA as entailed by Bayes’s Theorem. See
Stone, “CORNEA, Scepticism and Evil,” 8. His considered response is that CORNEA is true,
but that it alone cannot defeat the argument; we have other reasons for thinking that premise
1 is true. Stone (“CORNEA, Scepticism and Evil,” 3) cites Wykstra’s 2004 Central APA talk,
“Stone-Ground CORNEA: A Rebuttal,” as pivotal in his coming to see that his earlier argument against the truth of CORNEA is fallacious.
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Unlike many other critics of the evidential argument, I will grant Stone
premise 1, for the sake of argument. There is a burgeoning literature on
CORNEA to which I have nothing to add here. It is my goal in this paper
to show that even if 1 were true, there still would be good reasons to deny
the soundness of the argument.
Stone’s original formulation of the second premise was “we are justified in believing that theism entails MT.”14 Stone rejected that formulation due to considerations that Plantinga raises with his Free Will Defense
(FWD). Stone reads the FWD as providing a possible state of affairs in
which theism is true and it is false that every significant suffering we see
results in an outweighing utility.15 Thus, the Free Will Defense provides a
possible scenario where theism is true and MT is false, and so “that theism
entails MT” is false, given the FWD. For when I rob an old lady (call her
Maud), according to Stone’s understanding of the FWD, there isn’t any
positive or negative utility, say, my having freewill, in which this act
results. Rather, the utility of my having efficacious free will is already there
and would be there even if I didn’t rob Maud. So there is an instance of
suffering—Maud’s suffering—that doesn’t result in some positive or negative utility (“result” in the understanding spelt out above in the discussion
of premise 1). Stone calls such instances of suffering which do not result
in positive or negative utility “pointless evils”; others in the debate call
them gratuitous evils.16 Thus, Stone concludes, theism is compatible with
pointless moral evils.17
Theism is compatible with pointless natural evils as well, claims Stone,
since, for all we know, God could have made beings with efficacious freewill who rebelled against God—call them fallen angels, or demons—who
cause all the forest fires, cancer, and other “natural evils” of the world. For
the same reasons as given above, the evil these beings cause is compatible with theism and pointless. Thus, theism is compatible with pointless
natural evils. Since natural and moral evils are taken to divide all evils
between them and theism is compatible with pointless evils of each type,
theism is compatible with pointless evil simpliciter.18 And thus, we have
reason to believe that theism does not entail MT, contrary to the original

Stone, “Evidential Atheism,” 260.
Ibid., 266.
16
Ibid., 258.
17
A referee points out that the defender of the FWD might believe that God could not
prevent the evil of Maud’s being robbed without losing a greater or equal good or incurring
a greater or equal evil. And so God’s allowing Maud to be robbed is not pointless. The referee
generalizes this to all cases of moral evil. If this referee is correct, then Stone has not shown
that theism does not entail MT. I leave this question to one side. My goal in this paper is to
show Stone’s current version of the argument to be faulty; it is not to question or challenge
the steps he took to arrive at this version. If this referee is correct, then there is another reason
to challenge Stone’s argument.
18
Better, perhaps, to say that this demon response entails that all evil is moral evil, and then
distinguish between moral evil caused by humans and moral evil caused by fallen angels.
14
15
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formulation of premise 2. Stone concludes, “[a]s theism is consistent with
pointless suffering, it evidently does not entail MT” (his emphasis).19
On account of this, Stone has to find a way to modify the original
second premise of the argument so that its antecedent does entail MT. For,
if he does not, then he will not be able to apply premise 3 to 1 and 2. And
so, it is important to note, however Stone modifies the original 2, the thing
he must secure is an antecedent that entails MT, otherwise he’ll have the
very same problem he admits to having with the original 2; he will have
made no progress toward giving a sound evidential argument from evil.
In modifying the argument to respond to this objection, Stone employs
the concept of a “zany” world. Since the concept of a zany world features
prominently in the forthcoming argumentation, and since he says relatively little by way of explication of it, I will quote his introduction of it in
full here. He writes:
[M]y response [to the fact that theism alone does not entail MT] is to modify
EPE [the Evidential Problem of Evil]. A “zany” world involves, relative to
our probable beliefs about the actual world, a bizarre scenario, an improbable ontology, or a plainly factually mistaken claim. Demon worlds are zany,
for instance. So as not to beg the question against theism, we will proceed on
the (reasonable) supposition that a world’s having God in it does not make
it zany.20

According to Stone, theism conjoined with “our world is not zany” entails
MT. In what follows, my analysis of this argument will focus heavily on
whether or not we have reason to think that our world is zany.
One thing to note before discussing the remaining premises is that the
modified 2 still does not secure an entailment between the antecedent and
the consequent. This is because MT entails the existence of “widespread
and terrible suffering” around us. The existence of God in a non-zany
world does not entail widespread and terrible suffering, though. It is
logically possible that God create a non-zany world lacking suffering. For
instance, God could create a deterministic universe of great beauty that
lacks sentient creatures. And so it is possible that the antecedent be true
and the consequent be false. Thus, the entailment claim is false. To save
the entailment, Stone would have to reword MT.21 In what follows, I will
assume that there is a way to reword MT such that it doesn’t include the
existence of widespread and terrible suffering.
Concerning the remaining steps in the argument, I have little to say.
Premises 3 and 6 are truths of probability.22 4 follows from 1–3; 5 from 1,
Stone, “Evidential Atheism,” 266.
Ibid.
21
I thank Thomas Flint for this point.
22
Stone’s third premise is revised from the original. Originally, it read “for any propositions p and q, if what we see makes q improbable, and we have a justified belief that p
entails q, then what we see makes p unlikely” See Stone, “Evidential Atheism,” 267. That
is false, however. As Michael Almeida notes in footnote 8 of his “On Stone’s Evidential
Atheism,” Theoria 76:1 (2006), an additional necessary condition must be met for 3 to be
19
20
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2, and 4; and 8 from 1–7. This leaves premises 2 and 7 to be evaluated. In
the next section I discuss these premises. I show that a theist should reject
one or the other of these premises. In the following section, I further show
that, for reasons independent of theism, there is good reason to reject
premise 7.
A Dilemma About Zaniness
Consider two premises of Stone’s argument. Premise 2 states that we are
justified in believing that, necessarily, if God exists and the world is not zany,
then every significant suffering that makes up the widespread and terrible suffering we see about us results in an outweighing positive or negative utility; and
premise 7 states that probably, we are not in a zany world.
My argument, summarized, is as follows. Either the main religious traditions of the world require one to affirm propositions that entail that the
world is zany or they do not. If the main religious traditions of the world
entail that the world is zany, then no religious theist—no theist who is part
of a mainline religious community—will affirm premise 7, that, probably,
the world is not zany. If the main world religions do not require one to
affirm that the world is zany, then no religious theist need grant premise 2.
In what follows I will provide examples from traditional Christian theism,
though the point can be made equally well using examples from other
religious traditions.23
A question: Is the following, or any part of it, a bizarre scenario? A
virgin gives birth to a God-man who, within the next forty years, heals the
sick, raises the dead, walks on water, casts out demons, dies for the sins of
the world, descends into Hell, rises from the dead, ascends into Heaven
and, much later, during a bodily resurrection of all people who have ever
died, comes again in glory to judge the living and the dead, founding a
kingdom that will have no end. Given our probable beliefs, would this
occurring make the world zany? I’m not sure what Stone would say. Consider the options.

true: the prior probability of p must be higher than the posterior probability of q. That is,
the probability of p without taking into account what we see must be higher than the probability of q after taking into account what we see. In light of this, Stone changed the consequent of 3 from the original “then what we see makes p unlikely” to the new “then p is
unlikely given what we see.” This change removes the makes from the original consequent.
This allows for instances where, for instance, p is unlikely on the evidence in question,
but not made unlikely by that evidence. See Almeida, “On Stone’s Evidential Atheism,” 9,
for a counterexample to 3 as originally stated. Almeida presents some clever and complex
objections to Stone’s argument in this article. Stone responds to at least some of them in
“CORNEA, Scepticism and Evil.” I leave it to the reader to judge whether those objections
have been met.
23
My strategy here is to show that Stone’s argument is not dialectically useful against the
theist of any mainline religious group, since such a theist will have reason to reject either
premise 2 or premise 7 of the argument. I am not giving an argument for God’s existence.
Likewise, the prior probabilities of Christian doctrine are not germane to my argument.
Christian doctrines are given merely as examples. I thank an anonymous referee for noting
that I need to make this point.
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If he says “yes”—that what all traditional Christians believe in virtue
of being Christian entails that the world is zany—then no Christian will
grant him that 7, probably, the world is not zany. A similar question can be
asked using Muslim or Jewish or Hindu or Buddhist examples. Thus, if
Stone answers “yes,” then his religious interlocutors will deny 7.24
If Stone says “no”—that the contents of traditional Christian theism do
not entail that the world is zany given our probable beliefs—I don’t see
what makes a demon world zany. If our probable beliefs do not entail that
a world in which Jesus raises Lazarus from the dead or changes water into
wine is zany, what makes them deem as zany worlds where demons cause
natural evil? My point here is not that traditional Christianity is zany. My
point is that, as far as comparative judgments of zaniness go, if the doctrine of the Trinity of persons in the Godhead is not sufficiently bizarre,
all by itself, to render the world zany, then I see no warrant in judging a
demon world to be zany.25 If the creedal statements of traditional Christianity do not make the world zany, then we need to see evidence for why
demons causing natural evil does.
Recall Stone’s reason for moving from mere theism to C in the antecedent of 2. Conjoining theism with the claim that the world isn’t zany was
supposed to cut out the defenses that make some people say, “Oh, come
on!” Stone noted that though theism doesn’t entail MT, if we can rule out
bizarre scenarios like demons causing natural evil, then perhaps we could
secure an entailment between theism plus whatever-we-use-to-rule-outdemon-scenarios, on the one hand, and MT, on the other.
The problem, though, is that if such a conjunction does not rule out virgin
births and salvific deaths, guardian angels and prowling devils looking for
24
A referee wonders: if Christianity itself is sufficient to render a world zany, is not that
a strike against the truth of Christianity? Christianity would, then, have to be such that it is
bizarre, false, or ontologically improbable given our probable beliefs about the actual world.
But being bizarre, false, or ontologically improbable given our probable beliefs about the
actual world is a bad-making quality, and in fact should count as evidence against a view.
And so the Christian (or, any religious theist who affirms enough supernatural activity to
render a world zany) gets out of the Evidential Argument from Evil only to land in the
bonfire of zanity.
A first thing to note here is that, even if the referee were right on this point, it wouldn’t
show that this response to Stone’s argument is faulty. Rather, it would show that this response opens the respondent up to another, distinct, problem. And it would be a problem
only if the religious theist weren’t prepared to accept that, given her stripe of theism, the
world is, in fact, zany. One way for a proposition to be zany is for it to be bizarre, and the
religious theist might not see any problem in her religious beliefs being counted as bizarre. In
fact, some religious philosophers have argued against other religions precisely because they
lack miracles, divine signs, or wonders (e.g., see the medieval Christian arguments against
Islam premised upon the claim that Mohammed performed no miracles). Divine signs and
wonders, such as parting a sea, or turning water into wine, though, surely seem bizarre. And
so the religious theist I have in mind might see no problem with her religious views entailing
that the world is zany. She might desire such a consequence.
Finally, in the next section I provide an argument independent of religious motivations
against premise 7. If that argument is apt, then it is unlikely that our world is not zany. And if
it is unlikely that our world is not zany, it shouldn’t worry a theist overmuch if her particular
brand of theism does entail that our world is zany.
25
I thank an anonymous referee for helping me clarify the point at issue in this paragraph.
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the ruin of souls, the Trinity and the incarnation, I have trouble seeing how
it rules out demon worlds. And, if it cannot rule out demon worlds, then C
fares no better in entailing MT than mere theism did, since C would be consistent with a demon world. And a demon world, Stone readily admits, allows for the possibility of pointless evils. So if Stone answers “no”—that the
contents of traditional Christian belief do not entail that the world is zany—
then there is no entailment between the antecedent of 2 and its consequent.
Adding the claim that the world is not zany to the antecedent of the original
2 does not yield an entailment between the beefed up antecedent and the
consequent. His second premise, then, still faces the problem he introduced
the concept of a zany world to solve. In other words, if he answers “no,”
then his religious interlocutors will deny 2.
In summary, Stone must grant the disjunction that the traditional doctrines of the main world religions, if true, entail that the world is zany or
that it is not the case that they entail that the world is zany. If they do entail
that the world is zany, then no religious interlocutor will affirm 7. If it is
not the case that they entail that the world is zany, then no religious interlocutor will affirm Stone’s revised 2. And so in neither case will a religious
interlocutor affirm the truth of all of Stone’s premises. Thus, the religious
interlocutor will judge the argument to be unsound.
While my argument employed particularly Christian examples, one can
run a parallel argument for practically any other religious group merely
by changing the examples. Is a man’s talking with an angel a bizarre scenario? Does the existence of a devil entail an improbable ontology? Would
it be a bizarre scenario were every dead person to rise from his or her
grave for a final judgment? If the answer to any of these three questions
is “yes,” then Judaism and Islam are both zany. It is true that an ontology
including the mere existence of the devil wouldn’t be as improbable as an
ontology where the devil exists and freely causes so-called natural evils.
That said, though, an improbable ontology or bizarre scenario is enough
to entail a zany world. Even if the demons-causing-evil ontology is more
improbable than a mere-demon ontology, the fact that the mere-demon
ontology is improbable (if it is improbable) is sufficient for Islam and Judaism to be zany, along with Christianity.
I conclude that religious theists will not be moved by Stone’s new evidential argument. What about those neutral to the truth of theism?
An Inductive Argument for the Zaniness of the Actual World
In what follows I will give a second argument against Stone’s revised Evidential Problem of Evil, an argument that doesn’t rely on the thoughts of
religious believers and which is parallel to his own argument. I will argue
that we have good reason to believe that 7 is false.
Something is zany relative to probable beliefs. Relative to whose probable beliefs? Given the probable beliefs of a second-century farmer, would
a modern-day hospital—with all its technical wonders—be enough to
make the world zany? For instance, would a heart or face transplant be a
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bizarre enough scenario to render the world zany? If so, and if the beliefs
of second-century farmers count in determining whether a world is zany,
then we should deny 7, the claim that probably we are not in a zany world.
We should take careful note of Stone’s language. He writes that a world
is zany when “relative to our probable beliefs,” it fulfills one or more of his
three criteria. Perhaps we should take the first person pronoun seriously
and think that a world is zany relative to our current epistemic state, and
that premise 7 means to affirm that the world, given our contemporary
epistemic state, probably isn’t zany. Again we can ask, though, whose
contemporary epistemic state? If Stone means probable simpliciter, as he
defines it, he means the beliefs that almost everyone has, beliefs with a
probability of 0.9 or higher, beliefs that a fully rational person would affirm (not just proclaim a good bet).26 I’m not sure what probable beliefs
most contemporary humans have in regard to the world, but I am the
greatest living expert on my own beliefs, so I can speak somewhat confidently for them.
Do I have any groundings for belief such that, were a fully rational
person to have them, she would find it probable that this world is not zany,
and not simply claim it is a good bet that this isn’t such a world? None
of which I’m aware. Why think that earlier generations had a monopoly
on the world being zany relative to their probable beliefs? A pessimistic
induction leads me to think otherwise. Relative to the probable beliefs of
everyone alive prior to Einstein, this world is zany (given that the truth of
the Theory of Relativity and its entailments is a bizarre scenario, relative
to their probable beliefs). Do I have any good reason to think that the same
fate is not awaiting my own beliefs in light of a forthcoming scientific discovery? I am not aware of any such reason.
Had I lived prior to Antony van Leeuwenhoek’s discovery of microbes
in 1674, surely the claim that thousands of very small animals live inside
my mouth and intestines would have qualified as a bizarre scenario and
an improbable ontology relative to my probable beliefs. (“Do you really
expect me to believe that there are thousands of creatures around and inside me that I can’t see, some of which defend my body against others that
cause much of the evil that I suffer, such as pneumonia? That is zany!”)
Today, however, such a scenario is not (or is only mildly) bizarre, and we
think it isn’t an improbable ontology relative to our probable beliefs. Am I
90 percent sure that there are no more such surprises coming my way?
Why would I be?
One response goes like this: Of course the people of van Leeuwenhoek’s
time were flabbergasted by such a discovery. Who wouldn’t be? However, the
shock was relative to their improperly grounded beliefs. They didn’t have any
probable and well grounded beliefs whatsoever that a fully-rational person
would, on the basis of those beliefs, affirm that “there aren’t thousands of
26
Stone, “Evidential Atheism,” 254: “The claim that p is probable simpliciter asserts that
most everyone has grounds that make p probable for him.”
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creatures that live inside me, creatures that I cannot see, which cause much
of the evils I suffer.” If they thought they did, they weren’t behaving fullyrationally. So, the microbes example isn’t an example in which the world
was zany to the probable and well grounded beliefs of seventeenth-century
individuals. After all, what properly grounded justification could they have
for the belief that “there aren’t thousands of creatures that live inside me,
creatures that I cannot see, which cause much of the evils I suffer” such that,
given that justification, a fully-rational person would affirm the statement
and not merely claim it to be a good guess? As such, this is not an example
of a zany situation in the past.
This response, however, cuts both ways. For, suppose people in seventeenth-century Netherlands did not have proper groundings for their beliefs relative to which “there aren’t thousands of creatures that live inside
me, creatures that I cannot see, which cause much of the evils I suffer” is
probable and thus makes a world in which such creatures exist zany. What
are the proper groundings for beliefs that Stone has such that the claim
“there aren’t thousands of creatures that live outside me, creatures that I
cannot see, which cause much of the evils I suffer” is probable relative
to them? Sure, Stone would be flabbergasted if he were to find out there
were demons who behaved in such a manner. However, the shock would
be relative to his unjustified or improperly grounded beliefs.
On the other side of the dilemma, suppose that the people in seventeenth-century Netherlands did have properly grounded beliefs such that
the existence of microbes is zany. In that case, why should I think that,
probably, the world isn’t zany now relative to my own properly grounded
beliefs? Again, why should I think that the generations prior to mine had
a monopoly on bizarre scenarios and improbable ontologies, relative to
their properly grounded beliefs? And even if I do believe that my properly
grounded beliefs are such that no truth I could ever learn would involve
a bizarre scenario or an improbable ontology relative to them, I certainly
don’t have justification to make that belief probable, which is what premise 7
requires.
One can argue against premise 7 of Stone’s argument in the following
parallel of Stone’s reasoning. Call a breakthrough in our scientific thought
that entails a bizarre scenario or an improbable ontology, given our probable beliefs, a Serious Scientific Surprise. Examples of Serious Scientific
Surprises include the discoveries of microbes, the theory of relativity, and
quantum theory. Prior to each of these discoveries, their contents were
viewed as improbable and bizarre, given the probable beliefs of the scientific community at the time. Consider this argument:
9. What we see of scientific advancement makes it improbable that there
are no more Serious Scientific Surprises coming our way [call this italicized portion ~SSS] (premise).
10. We know that the world’s being not-zany entails ~SSS (premise).
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3. For any propositions p and q, if what we see makes q improbable,
and we know p entails q, then p is unlikely given what we see
(premise).
11. If what we see of scientific advancement makes ~SSS improbable,
and we know that the world’s being not-zany entails ~SSS, then it is
unlikely that the world is not zany, given what we see of scientific
advancement (substitution from 3).
12. Given what we see of scientific advancement, it is unlikely that we
are not in a zany world . (9, 10, 11)
What we see of scientific advancement is that countless previous generations had beliefs upon which later scientific findings were bizarre and
improbable. Furthermore, we see that we are not in a better epistemic
situation concerning improbable or bizarre findings than those previous
generations were. That is, we see that there is no good safeguard in place
that assures that the world will not turn out bizarre or include an improbable ontology on our probable beliefs, as it has on the probable beliefs of
all previous generations. Consider the premises of this argument.
Premise 9 says that given these things we see of scientific advancement,
it is improbable that there are no more Serious Scientific Surprises coming.
Given that I see that countless previous generations have faced Serious
Scientific Surprises, and that my own generation has no special protection
against Serious Scientific Surprises, it is improbable that there are no more
Serious Scientific Surprises coming our way.
Premise 10 states that we know that the world’s being not zany entails
that there are no more Serious Scientific Surprises coming our way. This is
true, since, according to Stone, a world is zany if and only if it has, relative
to our probable beliefs, an improbable ontology or a bizarre scenario or a
plainly factually mistaken claim. If there is a Serious Scientific Surprise, as
I have defined it, then there must be either a bizarre scenario or an improbable ontology relative to our probable beliefs (or both). And so if there is a
Serious Scientific Surprise, then, given the definition of “zany,” the world
would have to be zany.27 Contraposed, then, if the world is not zany, there
27
A reader has charged me with equivocation at this point, since a world with Serious
Scientific Surprises is not the sort of zany world that Stone envisions. I deny the charge.
One equivocates when one uses a term at least twice with at least two definitions. But here
I have been careful to remain true to the definition that Stone has given to his term of art. I
agree with the reader that Stone most likely did not have these sorts of cases in mind when
defining the term “zany.” But then it is incumbent on the proponent of this argument to
define “zany” in such a way that avoids these cases. Such a definition will also have to count
mere theism as non-zany, as Stone says, to avoid begging the question against the theist.
Finally, to be dialectically useful against a religious theist, the definition will need to remain
such that a theist would want to deny that the world is zany. It is no dialectical help to define
“zany” such that a religious worldview that includes signs and wonders is a worldview that
entails that the world is zany. If the definition of “zany” straightforwardly entails that, given
any religious worldview, the world is zany, no theist, as I argue, will grant premise 7. My
own thought on the matter is that defining the term “zany” in a dialectically useful way such
that (i) naturalistic discoveries, (ii) a supernatural God and (iii) the truth of the main tenets of
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cannot be any more Serious Scientific Surprises coming our way. So, we
are justified in believing that the world’s being not zany entails ~SSS. And
so, given the rule of reasoning expressed in premise 3, it follows that the
world’s being zany is likely.
We can follow Stone’s reasoning concerning his premises 1 and 2 closely
here, almost to the word. Each of 9 and 10 has a probability of .9 (given
the high probability that Stone says justification requires). Their conjunction has a probability of .81; as that conjunction entails that we are in a
zany world, and likelihood is preserved under entailment according to the
probability calculus, “we are not in a zany world” has a likelihood of no
more than 0.19—a long shot.28
So I don’t think that Stone’s premise 7, “probably, we are not in a zany
world,” has a likelihood above .9, and that a fully rational person would
affirm it, and not merely claim it to be a good bet. Furthermore, I do think
something much stronger: that, probably, we are in a zany world, given
the argument from Serious Scientific Surprises.
I conclude that, starting from a dialectically neutral standpoint between
theism and atheism, one has good reason to deny premise 7 of Stone’s evidential argument. Hence, starting from such a standpoint, one has good
reason to believe the argument to be unsound.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that Stone’s new evidential argument from
evil is unsound. I have argued this from two distinct dialectical standpoints: that of a religious theist, and that of someone neutral between
theism and atheism. In neither case, I argue, will the person in that dialectical standpoint judge all of Stone’s premises to be true.29
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the more populous religious traditions do not make the world zany, though demons causing
evils does, will be a difficult task. Such a concept does not seem to cut nature at its joints.
28
Compare to Stone, “Evidential Atheism,” 261–262: “‘not-MT’ and ‘not-MT entails
atheism’ each have a probability of .9, their conjunction has a probability of .81; as that conjunction entails atheism, and likelihood is preserved under entailment according to the probability calculus, theism has a likelihood of no more than 0.19—a long shot.”
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